antiTree | posts and projects

This post goes into what tor’s onion service authentication features do, how they work, and when they should be used based on your threat model because I couldn’t find any other documentation about it besides reading the spec. “Stealth” only provides “stealthy” properties against malicious HSDirs and basic has some additional obfuscation measures that might make your service better protected. Onion Service Authentication Feature An onion/hidden service supports two types of built in authentication:

One of Docker’s many updates this year was adding seccomp support. In short, seccomp/secomp-bpf is a way of filtering the system calls that you want to allow an application to make. It’s used for sandboxing enforcement it a lot of projects including Chromium, bubblewrap, and SubgraphOS. In Docker, it’s enabled by default (in supported environments) and has a default profile that is fine, but there’s always ways to customize it. (Even you should never do this.

I’ve written about [customizing PhantomJS to defend against fingerprinting]({{ ref “post/2015-05-18-browser-fingerprinting-attack-and-defense-with-phantomjs2015/05/18/browser-fingerprinting-attack-and-defense-with-phantomjs/” >}}) but I never really looked at what affect Selenium (the driver that control lots of different Browsers) has on the fingerprintability of say something like the Tor Browser Bundle. Some people at the Tor Project are looking into using tor-browser-selenium or the like to automate control of a Tor Browser instance. For tasks like trying to detect whether an exit is manipulating content to the user it would be useful to emulate exactly what a user’s experience would be with TBB.

Continuation from previous posts: 1 and 2 Website Fingerprinting Defenses at the Application Layer I like research projects on subjects that I feel have no hope. So here’s hoping for hope! This research is attempting to specifically defend onion services from being fingerprinted. The most common attack scenario is when an adversary is able to inspect the traffic between the tor client and the network and correlate the amount of traffic sent, to the size of known onion services.

Continuation from previous post: 1 Waterfilling: Balancing The Tor Network With Maximum Diversity This paper is proposing a new tor circuit path selection algorithm that makes bigger nodes run middle/relay traffic more often and smaller nodes more become exits exits. Apparently the talk included an abridged history of tor’s path selection: 2003: Uniform at random 2004: Introduce bandwidth weighting for performance 2005: add Guards based on Helper nodes 2010: add bandwidth weights to map node capacity into probability of use in different positions (guard, middle, exit) The main goal of this new algorithm is to make very large tor servers (which are a higher risk of being used in a traffic correlation attack because they serve a higher percentage of tor clients) serve more relay traffic, and less guard or exit traffic.

The annual Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS) 2017 is a privacy nerd’s dream and has always been on my list to attend. Unfortunately, I did not make it out to Minnesota to attend but all the papers are readily available online so yay, open access! These are my notes about some interesting research presented this year based on the papers that were released and the live tweets that Nick Mathewson was doing during the event.

Summary This blog post is going to show you how to go from exploiting a single container to gaining root on an entire cluster and all nodes. This is caused by a default flaw in the way Kubernetes manages containers. I’m doing a lot more container work at my day job – looking for container breakouts, container infastructure review, and orchestration technologies. I’ve been involved in a few Kubernetes reviews and talked with others in the company about it and there’s one vulnerability that seems to make it into almost every report and yet no one thinks it’s as important as the security folks.

If you’re like me and want to stand up a quick server that can response on all ports, here’s a quick way to do it. You’ll need a ton of memory to pull this off so setup your machine or VM accordingly. This works for nginx but you’ll have to go through some of the same steps for other services. Linux Ulimits Check current ulimits, hard limits, and soft limits on your current account: ulimit -n ulimit -Hn ulimit -Sn

UPDATE: The source repository for all this code is hosted here: Check out the previous 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the other CTF challenges. Rebound Attack I admit this this was the most complex one which is why it was worth 500. The idea is I want you to exploit yourself in very specific ways. This is adapting a research project from years ago where I fingerprint people based on the DNS requets they make.

Check out the previous 1, 2, and 3 for the other CTF challenges. Hop Till You Drop The original plan for this one was to show how you can setup an exit node to allow single hop circuits – in other words, you don’t create a full 3 hop circuit on tor but just use the exit node as the one and only proxy. This is normally banned unless you allow it both at the exit and on the client.

This is a continuation of the previous posts talking about BSidesROC onion related CTF challenges. Port of Onion (PoO) I don’t think anyone got this one mostly because I think they were expecting that it was going to take too long. Here’s the clue: Sail with me on a 3 hour cruise A storm hits us hard but we must not lose Take any port in a storm Just to get some place warm There's only one there; which do you choose?

This is a continuation of the previous post talking about BSidesROC onion related CTF challenges. Double Ontonion One team figured this one out. The point of this challenge is to exemplify a common problem with onion services. Basically, if you don’t configure the web server correctly, there are cases where an onion service might leak additional information about the host. For example, if you were hosting an onion web service on the same server as another web service, you could sometimes replace the Host header with something like “localhost” and have crushing results.

Now that BSidesROC is over and the CTF is closed, I can share some of the details about the Onions CTF category that I made. I think the feedback was that a lot of the challenges were too hard or they were straight-forward but they took too long to do. Setup Each of the services in the Onions category contained a vanity BSidesROC onion address. This was thanks to my friend who threw some GPU cycles at generating keys for services that either start with or end with “bsidesroc”.

Our little hacker conference that usually draws about 400 people is happening again on 4-21 and 4-22. If you want the song and dance about all the things we have planned, you can check out the website. I want to cover all the internal changes. Volunteers We’re getting old. What can I tell you. The longer you run something like BSidesROC (and Interlock and 2600 for that matter) the more likely your core people are going to have different priorities and interests.

I’ve made a scalable way of building a fully private functioning tor network using Docker. Why give any back story, if it’s useful to you, then here you go: Source: Docker Hub: Setup All you really need to do is clone the git repo, build the image (or download from Docker Hub) and then spin up a network to your liking. What’s nice about this is you can use the docker-compose scale command to build any size network that you want.